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Concept developmentWe provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why chil-
dren who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old
children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They
observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball
was taken from box 1, the child was reminded of it being a rattle, and emphasising its being a rattle it
was put back into box 1. Then the agent returned, the object was hidden in the experimenter’s hands
and removed from box 1, described as a ‘‘rattle,” and transferred to box 2. Children who passed false
belief had no problem saying where the puppet would look for the ball. However, in a different condition
in which the agent was also shown that the ball was a rattle they erroneously said that the agent would
look for the ball in box 1, ignoring the agent’s knowledge of the identity of rattle and ball. Their problems
cease with their mastery of second-order beliefs (she thinks she knows). Problems also vanish when the
ball is described not as a rattle but as a thing that rattles. We describe how our theory can account for
these data as well as all other relevant data in the literature.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).0. Introduction
We present a theory of how children represent belief based on
mental files. Mental files play an important role in philosophy,
addressing longstanding issues about Russell’s (1910) problem of
acquaintance (Recanati, 2012) and Frege’s (1892) foundational
problems of logics about identity and the sense-reference distinc-
tion (Perry, 2002). As discourse referents they play a role in linguis-
tics (Heim, 1982; Kamp & Reyle, 1993; Karttunen, 1976). In
psychology they have only been used in isolated places for object
files (Pylyshyn, 2007; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). They have not
played any significant role in the popular area of ‘‘theory of mind”
research, apart from some attempts to apply discourse referents to
developmental phenomena hidden in the context of philosophy
journals (Perner & Brandl, 2005; Perner, Rendl, & Garnham,
2007). This is somewhat surprising since mental files theory in phi-
losophy has been used extensively to deal with the pernicious log-
ical problems created by statements about beliefs and other
mental terms (Recanati, 2012).We intend to change this picture. We provide a coherent theory
of belief representation and test this theory with data from chil-
dren’s understanding of belief and its intensionality. In Section 1
we introduce the empirical problems to which we apply our the-
ory. In Section 2 we use this concrete material to introduce our the-
ory. In Section 3 we describe unique predictions of our theory and
present the results of testing those predictions.1. Children understanding intensionality
There is a curious window in child development, which opens
when a child first passes verbal false belief tasks1 around 4 years
and closes 2 years later when she passes second order belief tasks.
During this period children appreciate that others can have beliefs
that differ from their own, e.g.: Mistaken Max did not witness the
transfer of his chocolate to a new location and thinks it is still in
its original place (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer &




2 Rakoczy et al. used a pen/rattle. In our studies we used a ball/rattle, which we use
here as our paradigmatic example to make it consistent with later descriptions of the
same experimental conditions.
78 J. Perner et al. / Cognition 145 (2015) 77–88of belief, i.e., that belief about an object depends on the label under
which the object is known to the believer. Understanding of inten-
sionality appears with passing second-order belief tasks. Our theory
can explain these existing data but makes a bizarre prediction of a
sharp decline in performance on a novel intensionality task during
this window, and subsequent sharp improvement when the window
closes. These predictions were tested and confirmed.
This developmental window was discovered by Apperly and
Robinson (1998, 2001, 2003). Inspired by Russell (1987), they famil-
iarized 4- to 6-year-old subjects with two objects: a standard eraser
and an eraser that was also a die. Then a puppet, Heinz, appeared
and saw the two objects but was not informed of the dual nature
of the die-eraser. Then the knowledge question was posed: ‘‘Does
Heinz know that the die is an eraser?”. Subjectswhopassed the false
belief task had no problem answering ‘‘No”. But when the where-
look question was posed, ‘‘Where will Heinz look for an eraser?”,
the same children chose at randombetween the location of the stan-
dard eraser and the location of the die-eraser. Sprung, Perner, and
Mitchell (2007) showed that children who passed second-order
belief tasks only indicated the location of the standard eraser.
We refer to children who pass both first and second order verbal
false belief tasks as (++); children who pass first-order but fail
second-order verbal false belief tasks (+); and children who fail
both as (). The (+) children are those in Apperly and Robinson’s
window. Even though (+) children deny that Heinz knows that the
die is an eraser, they treat this fact as relevant to his behaviour. So
their grasp of how mental states determine behaviour seems inco-
herent. They do not fully understand the intensionality of belief.
From ‘‘Heinz knows that there is a die in location l” and ‘‘The die
is an eraser” they infer that Heinz will behave as though there is
an eraser in location l. At the same time, they deny that Heinz
knows that the die is an eraser. This incoherence is in dire need of
explanation. No existing explanation of this incoherence covers
all existing data.
Correct answers to the knowledge question might somewhat
antedate passing verbal false belief tasks because past evidence
has shown that children answer knowledge questions before they
understand false belief (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986;
Sodian, Thoermer, & Dietrich, 2006). They should nevertheless be
correlated because both tasks require that a subject understands
how the information available from an agent’s perspective differs
from the information available from the child’s own perspective.
Children must appreciate that from Heinz’ perspective, the infor-
mation that the die is an eraser is unavailable. To predict when chil-
dren cease to assume that Heinz will go for an eraser to where he
knows the die is, Sprung et al. (2007) drew on claims from Clark
(1997) and from Tomasello (1999, 2014) that describing an object
using different labels provides different perspectives on that object.
So successfully answering the question about where Heinz will look
for an eraser (the where-look question) requires understanding
embedded perspectives. Subjects must appreciate that from Heinz’
perspective, the eraser-perspective on the die is not available. Thus
correctly answering the where-look question is predicted to co-
occurwith passing tests of second ordermental states, where a sub-
ject must evaluate whether an agent thinks he knows something
(Perner & Howes, 1992).
Sprung et al. (2007) therefore predicted that 4- to 6-year old
children would have no problems with the where-look question
if information about an object was provided in a predicative man-
ner rather than in an individuating manner. To say that an object
is a stick is to individuate it in a certain way, to use a label that pro-
vides a perspective. To say that a stick is long is to predicate some-
thing of it, which does not provide a perspective on the object but
rather provides information about it relative to the established
perspective of being a stick. In Apperly and Robinson’s task, the
subject and the agent (Heinz) could both see an eraser and a diebut only the subject knew that the die was also an eraser. In a par-
allel task in Sprung et al. (2007), the child and the agent could see
both a long stick and a second, partially occluded stick, but only the
child knew that the occluded stick was also long. In this new task,
4- to 6-year-olds had no problem with either the knowledge ques-
tion (‘‘Does Heinz know that this stick is long?”) or the where-look
question (‘‘Where will Heinz go to get a long [stick]?”).
Rakoczy, Bergfeld, Schwarz, and Fizke (2015) demonstrate that
the curious problem with the where-look question about a die/era-
ser also disappears when the original task is simplified in that only
a single object (the die/eraser) is used without the plain eraser.
They conclude that (+) children understand intensionality;
Apperly and Robinson’s observations are to be explained by exces-
sive demands on memory load and ambiguity resolution that chil-
dren cannot meet before they are around 6 years old. The crucial
task (their experiment 3) involved a ball2/rattle instead of the die/
eraser and went as follows. Children were shown that the ball was
also a rattle. Then puppet Susi appeared. Child and Susi observed
the ball being placed in box 1. Susi left and the ball was removed
from box 1. Children were reminded that the ball was also a rattle.
The object was returned to box 1. Susi returned. The experimenter
reached into the box and made a hidden transfer: she hid the object
in her hands, removed it, called it a rattle, shook it to make it rattle,
and moved the rattle to box 2. Subjects were then asked where Susi
would look for the ball. The correct answer is box 1, since Susi does
not know that the rattle is the ball. To pass this test, subjects must
suppress their knowledge that the rattle is the ball. Consequently,
Rakoczy et al. (2015) maintain that this task tests the same abilities
as Apperly and Robinson’s first task, where children must suppress
their knowledge that the die is an eraser. Rakoczy et al. found that
(+) children had no problems with this task; there was no evidence
of Apperly and Robinson’s curious window.
We will shortly criticize Rakoczy et al.’s (2015) conclusions. But
whether or not the conclusions are right, the data pose a problem
for Apperly and Robinson’s theory. For in order to pass this test,
subjects must be aware that from the puppet’s perspective, the
ball-perspective on the rattle is not available. Thus Apperly and
Robinson would incorrectly predict that success on this task occurs
after success on first-order verbal false belief tasks, counter to the
findings in Rakoczy et al. (2015). For the same reasons these data
also pose a problem for the appeal to embedded perspectives in
Sprung et al. (2007).
However, Rakoczy et al. (2015) still have no explanation for
why the curious window appears when information about an
object is provided in an individuating manner, but disappears
when information is provided in a predicative manner. The pred-
icative cases seem to pose the same demands on working memory
and ambiguity resolution, yet the effect is not observed. Moreover,
Apperly and Robinson (2003) contrasted a false belief condition
with a dual identity condition, both of which had only one critical
object and identical test questions. They still found a difference in
difficulty, so the number of critical objects does not seem to be the
source of the difficulty.
In order to account for this inexplicable set of data we now pre-
sent a mental file theory of belief representation and apply it to
this set of data. In addition, we draw new predictions from it and
then test these predictions on 3½- to 7-year old children.
2. Mental files
A mental file is a tool for managing information about an object
in the world (say, the file’s referent or external referent). Files cap-
Fig. 1. A mental file.
Fig. 2. Horizontal linking.
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tion between what one is thinking/talking of (information that
fixes the file’s referent; individuating information) and what one
thinks/says about it (the information about the referent on the file;
predicative information). We say that a mental file is anchored to
the object it collects information about. All of these features are
illustrated in Fig. 1. A file is anchored to an external object, which
individuates the object as a butterfly (not as an insect or an animal)
and stores the predicative information that it is orange, etc.
Mental files also help us keep track of which information about
an object is available from which perspective, which can be differ-
ent conceptual perspectives (whether the rubber die is conceptu-
alised as a die or as an eraser) or different mental perspectives
(what different people think or know about an object). We begin
by describing some features of a mature mental filing system. Then
we describe how the developing filing systems of children depart
from the adult standard.
When a new label for an object is used the object is individuated
in a new way, which creates a new conceptual perspective on that
object. For each new conceptual perspective on an object, a new
mental file is opened that records information that is available
about the external referent from that perspective. For example,
the rubber die might function well as a die (it’s quiet when cast)
but poorly as an eraser (smudges the paper); consequently the
die-file records the predicative information that the object functions
well while the eraser-file records that it functions poorly.
Each file individuates its referent in exactly one way. But it con-
tains all predicative information that the file’s owner knows about
the referent from that conceptual perspective. Nonetheless, when
discussing or thinking about an object from one conceptual per-
spective, predicative information from other files for that object
is still available to the mature thinker. For example, when asked
whether the die would erase well, an adult has access to the infor-
mation, stored on the eraser-file, that it does not. To model this
phenomenon horizontal links between files that are anchored to
the same referent enable free flow of information between linked
files. Horizontal links establish sameness of referent between
linked files. Fig. 2 illustrates two horizontally linked files, which
are anchored to the same external object. Each file captures a dif-
ferent conceptual perspective on the object.
Note that the information ‘‘smudges paper” is written only on
the eraser-file, not on the die-file. Still, that information is available
from the perspective of the die-file, due to the horizontal link. We
adopt the following convention in some of our diagrams below
(e.g., Fig. 4). When information is written on a file B, and is
available from the perspective of file A due to a horizontal link,
we may write that information on file A, enclosed in parentheses
to indicate that the information is not really written on file A but
is available from that perspective.
In addition to the differences in conceptual perspective cap-
tured by allowing multiple files anchored to a single object, we
use mental files to capture differences in mental perspective. For
example, suppose Susi sees a ball being put in box 1; in her absence
the ball is moved to box 2. How does a test subject who observes
this situation store information about Susi’s beliefs? For mature
observers a regular file for the ball shows it in its new location
while a vicarious file indexed to Susi shows it in its old location.
Vicarious files are linked to regular files in order to establish same-
ness of referent between linked files. However, the flow of infor-
mation between linked regular and vicarious files must be
constrained, since a vicarious file may contain misinformation
(e.g., the chocolate still being in its old location), which must be
quarantined and not contaminate the information in the regular
files. For this reason vicarious files are linked to regular files by
vertical links (Recanati, 2012, chap. 14 and 15), which do not enable
the transfer of information as freely as horizontal links. This isillustrated in Fig. 3, where an adolescent uses regular files to store
her own information about the ball, and a vertically linked vicari-
ous file to store puppet Susi’s information about the ball. The ver-
tical link is indicated with a dashed line, since vertical links (unlike
horizontal links) do not allow free flow of information.
Children pass the false belief task at the same time as they can
make sense of identity statements (e.g., ‘‘the die is the eraser”;
Perner, Mauer, & Hildenbrand, 2011). Mental files theory can
explain this with the developmental assumption that around
4 years children become able to link files horizontally as well as
vertically (Perner & Leahy, in press). But at least three more taxing
aspects of mature filing may still be absent: (i) when should a reg-
ular file be copied to a vicarious file with the same individuating
label, (ii) when should horizontal links—indicating identity—be-
tween regular files be copied to vicarious files—indicating that
the holder of the vicarious files is aware of the identity, and (iii)
when should the predicative contents of a regular file be copied
to a vicarious file?
We make three additional developmental assumptions. (1) (+)
children overperform (i), generating too many vicarious files. (2)
(+) children underperform (ii), not horizontally linking vicarious
files, thereby disabling information transfer between them. (3a)
(+) children correctly perform (iii) when predicative information
is provided verbally; their vertical links correctly constrain the
flow of information between regular and vicarious files. (3b) How-
ever, perceptual information is not managed quite so well. When a
(+) child perceives that an agent gains perceptual information
about an object under some conceptual perspective x, the child
copies that information to all vicarious files anchored to that
object, not only to vicarious file x.
These problems dissolve around six years of age when children
become able to appreciate second-order beliefs. With these
assumptions we can explain all existing data pertaining to Apperly
Fig. 3. An adolescent uses a vicarious file to track Susi’s beliefs.
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Sprung et al. (2007) and Rakoczy et al. (2015). Moreover, our the-
ory generates new, remarkably counterintuitive predictions. We
test these and find them borne out by the evidence. Only our the-
ory makes these surprising predictions.Fig. 4. Data from Rakoczy et al. (201In the remainder of this section we use these assumptions to
answer the following questions: why can (+) children answer
Apperly and Robinson’s knowledge question, but not the where-
look question? Why can (++) children correctly answer both ques-
tions? Why is the critical task from Rakoczy et al. (2015) easy for
(+) children? And why are predication versions of the Heinz-
task easy for (+) children?
Why can (+) children answer the knowledge-question but
not the where-look question? In the Heinz scenario, (+) children
create a vicarious file for the die that is indexed to Heinz. Since
Heinz can’t tell by looking that the die is an eraser, they leave
the information ‘‘is an eraser” off the vicarious die-file. This is
why they can correctly answer the knowledge question, ‘‘Does
Heinz know that the die is an eraser?”
The child has a regular die-file for the object, which records that
it is an eraser, its location, etc., and a horizontally linked regular
eraser-file for the object, which records that it is a die, its location,
etc. The child correctly copies the regular die-file to a vicarious die-
file but incorrectly copies the regular eraser-file to a vicarious
eraser-file (assumption (1): children generate too many vicarious
files). The child can see that Heinz sees where the object is; thus
location information is copied onto both vicarious files (assump-
tion (3b): perceptual information gathered by an agent under
any conceptual perspective is copied to all vicarious files).5) explained with mental files.
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and Robinson’s where-look question by choosing randomly
between the location of the normal eraser and the die-eraser. There
is a vicarious eraser-file anchored to the normal eraser, and a vicar-
ious eraser-file anchored to the die-eraser. Both include location
information, and so the child chooses one of those locations at
random.
Why can (++) children answer the where-look question? Cor-
rect answers to the where-look question emerge together with cor-
rect answers to second-order belief questions. We propose that
both tasks require an ability to understand embedded perspec-
tives. The (++) children have learned that not all regular files
should be copied to vicarious files. A (++) child does not copy her
regular eraser-file to a vicarious eraser-file. So when asked where
Heinz will look for an eraser, children check their vicarious files
for Heinz, find only one file for an eraser, and answer the question
with the location information on that file. These children appreci-
ate that from Heinz’ perspective, the eraser-perspective on the die
is not available. That is, they understand embedded perspectives.
Why is the critical task from Rakoczy et al. (2015) easy?
Assumption (2) is that (+) children do not copy the horizontal
links between their regular files when copying these files to vicar-
ious files. Under this hypothesis, the critical task from Rakoczy
et al. (2015) is a variant of the false belief task. The vicarious
ball-file and the vicarious rattle-file are both anchored to the same
object. But since there is no horizontal link between the files, the
information that the rattle has moved to box 2 is not transmitted
from the vicarious rattle-file to the vicarious ball-file. Since the
agent only learns about the object’s transfer linguistically,3 infor-
mation crosses vertical links correctly (assumption 3a): it moves
from the regular rattle-file to the vicarious rattle-file, but not from
the regular ball-file to the vicarious ball-file. So the child does not
represent that the puppet knows that the ball has moved to box 2.
This is illustrated in Fig. 4. At the preparatory stage e0, when the
child is shown that the ball is also a rattle, the child anchors a reg-
ular ball- and a regular rattle-file to the object. When the child sees
in e1 how puppet Susi observes the object being put in the box, the
child forms a vicarious ball- and a vicarious rattle-file, indexed to
Susi (assumption 1). Since Susi sees that the object is a ball, the
information ‘‘is a ball” is recorded in her vicarious rattle-file; loca-
tion information is copied to both vicarious files (assumption 3b).
Since she does not see that the object is a rattle, ‘‘is a rattle” is left
off her vicarious ball-file. When child and Susi are linguistically
informed during the e3 hidden transfer that the rattle is being
moved, this is recorded on the child’s regular rattle file and on
Susi’s vicarious rattle file (assumption 3a). This vicarious rattle-
file is not horizontally linked to the vicarious ball-file (assumption
2). So the outdated location-information ‘‘in box 1” on the ball-file
will not be updated. Due to the horizontal link between the regular
files the information about the move is also available in the regular
ball-file. It fails to be copied from there to Susi’s vicarious ball file
since Susi was not told about the ball being moved (assumption 3a)
and did not perceive the ball during the move (assumption 3b).
Thus the child represents that Susi has a false belief about where
the ball is located. For this reason they correctly answer ‘‘Box 1”
when asked where Susi will look for the ball.
Why are predication tasks easy? Predicative information does
not cause the construction of a new file, as individuating informa-
tion does. When one is told, ‘‘This is a rattle,” one opens a new reg-
ular file that individuates the ostended object as a rattle. When one
is told, ‘‘This stick is long,” one does not open a new ‘‘long stick”3 Since the object is hidden, the agent does not see it, and so does not have visual
information about the transfer. The agent does hear the rattle shake, but this is not
information about the transfer. The agent does not hear the rattle being moved from
box 1 to box 2. So the agent only learns about the transfer linguistically.file, but rather records the information ‘‘long” on the regular
stick-file for that object. When a puppet sees two sticks, one long
and one partially occluded so that its length is not visible, the sub-
ject makes a vicarious file for each stick. One records that the stick
is long; the other records nothing about length. So when faced with
the question, ‘‘Where will puppet look for a stick that is long?”,
children check the puppet’s vicarious files and find only one for a
stick that is long. They respond with the location for that object.3. Experiment
With the assumptions that (+) children indiscriminately copy
regular files to vicarious files but do not copy horizontal links
between files, we make surprising new predictions. First, in an
agent-present variant of the critical experiment in Rakoczy et al.
(2015)—one where the puppet Susi also learns that the ball is a rat-
tle—we predict that (+) children will struggle with the question,
‘‘Where will Susi look for the ball?”. For children who fail to copy
links between vicarious files will not represent that Susi knows
the identity of the ball and the rattle by linking the puppet’s vicar-
ious files. Without these links, the information about the transfer
to box 2 will be recorded on the vicarious rattle-file but not on
the vicarious ball-file. Hence they should wrongly assert that Susi
will look in box 1.
Second, these problems should disappear in a predicative ver-
sion of the agent-present variant. In this version, when the exper-
imenter makes the hidden transfer, he describes the dual object
hidden in his hand as a ‘‘thing that rattles” instead of as ‘‘a rattle”.
We predict that the information that the object rattles is simply
recorded onto the vicarious ball-file, and so (+) children will have
no problem answering ‘‘Where will Susi look for the ball?” cor-
rectly (box 2). The following experiment tests these predictions.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Fifty-one children (29 female, 22 male) from one kindergarten
and one elementary school between the age of 44 months and
83 months (median age: 67 months, S.D. = 13.3) participated in
this experiment. Parents were previously informed and gave writ-
ten consent to experimental participation. One additional girl
could not finish all tests and her data were not included.
3.1.2. Design
Each child was given four dual description ‘‘intensionality”
tasks as a result of two factors, individuation (IND) vs. predication
(PRED) and agent present vs. absent. For each task a different mate-
rial was used: pen/lamp, ball/rattle, dolphin/squirter, or die/eraser.
In addition each child was given the vocabulary sub-test of the
HAWIK IV to assess their verbal intelligence, and one false belief
task and one knowledge task, each with a first order-belief ques-
tion (‘‘If we ask Susi, ‘Where is the marble?’ what will she say?”)
and a second-order belief question (‘‘If we ask Susi: Do you know
where the marble is? What will she say? Will she say ‘Yes, I know’
or ‘No, I don’t know’?”) in this sequence.
The seven tasks were administered in the following order: the
verbal intelligence test, an individuation andpredication in counter-
balanced order, a false belief or knowledge task, individuation and
predication (counterbalanced order), and a knowledge or false belief
test. Each of the four conditions agent absent/individuation, agent
present/individuation, agent absent/predication, and agent pre-
sent/predication occurred equally often in first position. The second
task of this kind alternated for individuation andpredication, and for
present and absent, e.g.: agent present/individuation, agent absent/
predication. The following tasks repeated the sequence but with
Fig. 5. Illustration of the agent-absent and -present conditions (centre panels) when individuating expressions (left panel) or predicative expressions (right panel) are used.
Broken line arrows symbolize movements, full line arrows changes in description. Episode 0: in the absence of puppet Susi children were familiarized with the dual function
object described as ‘‘a ball” and for individuating (IND) expressions also as ‘‘a rattle,” and in the predicative (PRED) description as ‘‘a ball that rattles”. Episode 1: in Susi’s
presence the ball was put in box 1. Episode 2: the ball was taken from box 1, its rattling property demonstrated and in the individuation condition described as ‘‘a rattle”, in
the predication condition as ‘‘a ball that rattles” and put back into box 1. This demonstration took place in Susi’s absence in the agent-absent conditions and in her presence in
the agent-present conditions. Episode 3: In Susi’s presence the object was taken from box 1 hidden in the experimenter’s hands. After its rattling sound was demonstrated, it
was described as ‘‘a rattle” (individuation) or as ‘‘a thing that rattles” (predication) and moved to box 2.
82 J. Perner et al. / Cognition 145 (2015) 77–88present and absent exchanged, e.g.: agent absent/individuation,
agent present/predication. The resulting four orders of conditions
were counterbalanced with a Latin Square design of story material
(pen/lamp, ball/rattle, dolphin/squirter, or die/eraser) resulting in
16 combinations. Each combination was given with either the false
belief task or the knowledge task in positions 3 and 6, respectively,
resulting in 32 different sequences altogether. Each child was
assigned randomly to one of the sequences until each sequence
had been used once whereupon a new random assignment was
begun until all children had been tested.
3.1.3. Procedure
All children were tested by a male experimenter in a quiet room
of their kindergarten or elementary school, respectively. Each ses-
sion lasted between 15 and 20 minutes.
3.1.3.1. Dual description ‘‘Intensionality” tasks.
Individuation conditions (IND). The procedure of these tasks is taken
fromRakoczyet al. (2015), Experiment3 (see our Fig. 4). Thedetailed
procedure is here described in four episodes, using the ball/rattle as
an example. The changes needed for agent-absent and -present
conditions are mentioned for each episode; those needed for the
predication conditions in a separate section (see Fig. 5).
Episode 0: General familiarization with the objects.
The child is introduced to puppet Susi, who is then put away.
Then the experimenter shows the child the two boxes and that they
are empty. Thenhe introduces the ball/rattle, points out that the ball
can be used as a rattle and explicitly mentions that Susi is playing
elsewhere and cannot see or hearwhat is going on. After the demon-
stration of the ball/rattle the experimenter emphasized again that
absent Susi could not have seen the demonstration and asked the
Know- question 1: ‘‘Does Susi know that the ball is also a rattle?”
Episode 1. Placing of the object in first location
Susi entered the scene, and the object was introduced as a ball
to Susi. Then it was put inside box 1. At the end Susi left the scene
(agent absent conditions) or stayed on for the next episode (agent
present conditions).Episode 2. Reminder of the object’s two aspects (identities)
The experimenter took the ball from box 1, called it ‘a ball’,
and demonstrated that the ball was also a rattle. Calling the
object ‘the rattle’, he put it back into box 1. During this episode
Susi was away on the playground in the agent-absent condition
but present in the agent-present condition and, thus, aware of
the dual nature of the object. The child then was asked for a sec-
ond time the Know- question 2: ‘‘Does Susi know that the ball is
also a rattle?”
Episode 3. Transfer of the object to box 2
In the agent-present condition Susi was already present. In the
agent-absent condition Susi came back from the playground and
entered the scene again. With Susi present the experimenter took
the object out of box 1 hiding the object in his hand and saying
‘‘Look Susi, I have here a rattle in my hand (shaking it to make
the rattling sound). I am putting it now over into this box (box
2).” Great care was taken to cover the object with his hands so that
neither child nor puppet Susi could see any of it. Then the battery
of test questions followed in this order:
Memory question: ‘‘Where did we put the ball in the beginning?”
Reality question: ‘‘Where is the ball now?”
Where-look question: ‘‘Where will Susi look for the ball?”
Where-look (control): ‘‘Where will Susi look for the rattle?”
No feedback was given to the child after a trial. The object was
then removed and Susi left the scene before a new trial was
started.
Predication conditions. These conditions were the same as the
individuation conditions with the following changes (using the
ball/rattle as example): in Episode 0 and Episode 2 the ball was
described as a ball that rattles and never as a rattle. The Know- ques-
tionwas accordingly changed to: ‘‘Does Susi know that the ball rat-
tles?” In Episode 3 Susi was told: ‘‘Look Susi, I have here a thing in
my hand that rattles (shaking it to make the rattling sound). The
where-look question (control) was accordingly modified: ‘‘Where
will Susi look for the thing that rattles?
Fig. 6. Percentage of correct responses to the where-look question. IND denotes the use of individuating descriptions and PRED the use of predicates for reference. ‘‘Absent”
and ‘‘present” refer to the absence or presence of the puppet agent in Episode 2. The x-axis in each panel shows the three categories of children according to their failing or
passing the 1st and 2nd order false belief test. The four lines correspond to the four conditions. For better visibility of theoretical predictions and to avoid overlap, predictions
of 100% and 0% correct are scattered around 90% and 10%, respectively. Error bars for the observed data show ±CI.
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and one knowledge task, each with a 1st and a 2nd order test ques-
tion (modelled after Perner & Howes, 1992). Susi put an object
(without a dual aspect, e.g. a marble) into box 1 and then either left
the scene (false belief task) or stayed put (knowledge task). Then
the object was transferred by the experimenter from box 1 to
box 2. Then Susi returned and the child was asked the following
questions in the following order:
Memory question: ‘‘Where did we put the marble in the
beginning?”
Reality question: ‘‘Where is the marble now?”
Test question 1st order: ‘‘If we ask Susi: Where is the marble?
What will she say?”
Test question 2nd order: ‘‘If we ask Susi: Do you know where the
marble is? What will she say? Will she say ‘Yes, I know’ or ‘No, I
don’t know’?”
Verbal intelligence test.Perner and Leahy (in press) argue that () children cannot link files. An
anonymous reviewer drew our attention to the following problem with that claim.
According to the present data, () children correctly answer the reality question,
‘‘Where is the ball now?”. But if () children cannot link files, why do they recognize
that the ball has moved to box 2 when they have only heard of the rattle being moved
to box 2? One possibility is that they are aided by the information, provided in
Episode 0, that the boxes were both empty before the ball/rattle was deposited.
Hence, they know that the only object in box 1 is the ball/rattle. When told that it is
being taken out children have both files, the ball- and the rattle-file anchored to it and
can register on both files that it is moved to box 2. The experimenter’s verbally
referring to the object as ‘‘the rattle” provides only redundant information and will
not quench the already activated ball-file. Hence when asked where the ball is they
can give a correct answer. Future studies will test this proposal.3.1.3.3. Verbal intelligence measure. In the HAWIK IV vocabulary test
(Petermann&Petermann, 2010) childrenwere asked to describe the
meaning of words like ‘clock’, ‘transparent’, or ‘leaving’.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. False belief task
Performance on the Memory and Reality questions was perfect
in the false belief and knowledge tasks. 12 children failed the first
order false belief test and were classified as (). Although 9 ofthem gave a fortuitously ‘‘correct” answer to the second-order
question, this does not indicate any understanding of second-
order belief but is a natural consequence of mistakenly believing
that Susi knows where the ball is. The 24 children who passed
the 1st order test but failed the 2nd order test were classified as
(+) and the remaining 14 children who passed both tests as (++).3.2.2. Dual description ‘‘Intensionality” tasks
Only 4 mistakes were made by the 51 children on the memory,
reality,4 and the two knowledge questions in all 4 conditions. Also
the where-look control question (Where will Susi look for the rat-
tle?) was answered correctly in 91% of all cases. Our main analyses
will rely exclusively on the first where-look question (Where will
Susi look for the ball?). We checked that scoring children as correct
only when both where-look questions were answered correctly did
Fig. 7. The agent absent/predication condition.
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answers to the critical where-look question are shown in Fig. 6 (bot-
tom right panel) together with predictions from two proposals in the
literature and from our mental files analysis. Predictions for each
category of children are as follows.
For () children all three theories make the same prediction.
They should succeed on the agent-present conditions and fail on
the agent-absent conditions since the agent’s absence leads to a
false belief about the location of the ball. Perner and Leahy (in
press) argue that this is because children who fail the first-order
false belief task cannot form vicarious files. () children answer
the where-look question on the basis of regular files that record
the object’s real location. This yields correct answers in both
agent-present conditions and incorrect answers in both agent-
absent conditions. Observations confirmed this prediction (bottom
right panel). Combined performance on the two agent-absent tasks
(dotted lines) is significantly below that of the two agent-present
tasks (Wilcoxon signed rank test: p 6 .006).
For (+) children the theories make quite different predictions.
Apperly and Robinson (1998, 2003) proposed that children’s prob-
lems in their tasks occur whenever an agent knows about an
object’s location under one description but is ignorant about it
under another description. This is the case in both agent-absentconditions. Therefore, children should fail on these tasks. Rakoczy
et al. (2015) claim that the problems found in Apperly and Robin-
son’s tasks vanish in their single object versions: hence the predic-
tion is that children who pass 1st order false belief should pass the
agent-absent condition, as Rakoczy et al. have shown. They should,
presumably, also pass the new agent-present condition since it is,
if anything, even easier than the agent-absent condition.
Mental files theory predicts correct answers by (+) children
in both agent-absent conditions and in the agent-present/
predication condition. Our predictions for the absent/individua-
tion condition were already described in connection with Fig. 4,
above. In the agent absent/predication condition (Fig. 7), (+)
children construct a regular ball-file at episode e0 and record
the predicative information that it rattles. At e1 they add the
predicative information that it is in box 1. The regular ball-file
is copied to a vicarious ball-file indexed to Susi. Since Susi can
see the object put inside box 1, this information is recorded on
her vicarious file, but not the information that it rattles, which
Susi does not have. Episode 2 makes no difference to the files;
it is redundant given the events of e1. When they are told ‘‘I have
a thing in my hand that rattles” during the hidden transfer, they
do not introduce a new regular file, since ‘‘thing that rattles”
matches their ball file, but they do introduce a new vicarious file
Fig. 8. Agent present/predication condition.
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answered by any of Susi’s existing files.5 This captures the fact
that Susi does not know that the transferred object is the ball. Since
no sortal was used, the file does not receive header information,
but the file is still vertically linked to the regular ball file, capturing
the child’s understanding that Susi’s knowledge is about the ball.
Predicative information that the object rattles and that it is moved
from box 1 to box 2 is stored in this new vicarious file. The vicar-
ious ball-file is not horizontally linked to the unheaded vicarious
file (assumption 2), so the information about the move does not
cross to the vicarious ball-file. Since Susi was told about the rattle’s
move but did not perceive it, information about the move is not
copied from the regular ball-file to the vicarious ball-file (assump-
tion 3a). When asked where Susi will look for the ball, (+) chil-
dren consult their vicarious ball-file, find the information ‘‘in box
1” written there, and so say that Susi will look in box 1.
In the agent present/predication condition (Fig. 8), Susi sees
that the ball rattles in Episode 2 and this property is registered
on her vicarious ball file. For this reason, the information given
in e3 (‘‘the thing that rattles”) matches Susi’s ball file and no extra
vicarious file needs to be created; and the transfer from box 1 to
box 2 witnessed by Susi is recorded on her vicarious ball-file.
Thus when asked ‘‘Where will Susi look for the ball?”, (+) chil-
dren consult Susi’s vicarious ball-file and find the information
that it is in box 2.
Mental files theory predicts incorrect answers in the agent-
present/individuation condition (Fig. 9) because (+) children fail
to horizontally link vicarious files. When told at e0 that the ball
is a rattle, they construct horizontally linked regular ball- and
rattle-files; each records the object’s dual identity as predicative
information. At e1 the regular files are both copied to vicarious files
(assumption 1) and predicative information about the location in
box 1 is recorded in all vicarious files (assumption 3b). Since Susi
cannot see that the object is a rattle but can see that it is a ball,
(+) children withhold the predicative information ‘‘is a rattle”
from the vicarious ball-file but do copy ‘‘is a ball” to the vicarious
rattle-file (assumption 3b). The vicarious files are not horizontally
linked (assumption 2). At e2 the predicative information ‘‘is also a
rattle” is added to the vicarious ball-file (assumption 3a). At e3 lin-
guistic information is given about the rattle. Only the regular rattle
file and Susi’s vicarious rattle file are addressed. So the information
about the transfer to box 2 is recorded in the two rattle-files
(assumption 3a). Horizontal linking between regular files makes
this information available from the perspective of the regular
ball-file. Lack of horizontal linking between vicarious files prevents
the information from reaching the vicarious ball-file from the
vicarious rattle-file. The information also fails to be copied from
the regular ball file to Susi’s vicarious ball file since Susi was only
told about the rattle’s move (assumption 3a) and did not perceive5 To cover this case we need to extend our initial limited discussion of when
children open new files in response to linguistic information. The general rule is that
when a referential expression is encountered, one first checks whether it matches any
existing file. If it does not match an existing file a new file is created. So when they
encounter the referential expression ‘‘thing that rattles” children check whether it
matches an existing file. We maintain that ‘‘thing”, at least as used here, is not a
sortal, but rather a place-holder for a sortal just like ‘‘I have one that rattles”.
Nevertheless, together with ‘‘that rattles” the expression matches the child’s regular
ball file, which contains the information that it rattles. Hence the child knows that the
thing being moved is the ball. Importantly, we assume here that children indepen-
dently check for matching files among Susi’s vicarious files. Since there is no vicarious
file that says anything about rattling, none matches the referential expression and so
a new file is created. Since ‘‘thing” does not provide a sortal, it remains open what
kind (sort) of thing it might be. Susi only knows that it rattles, whatever it may be.
This is captured by an unlabelled file that contains ‘it rattles’ as predicative
information. Moreover, since (+) children are able to understand identity they can
understand that what Susi has been made to think about (a thing that rattles) is
identical to the ball. Hence they can vertically link the new vicarious file to their
regular ball file.the object’s move (assumption 3b).6 Hence when asked where Susi
will look for the ball, only the outdated ‘‘Box 1” information is avail-
able, and so the incorrect answer is produced.
The data (Fig. 6, bottom right panel) confirm the predictions by
mental file theory remarkably well. In the agent-present/
predication condition and in both agent-absent conditions answers
were 80% or more correct (each above chance: Kolmogorov Smir-
nov, p 6 .001). In contrast, correct responses in the agent-present/
individuation condition appeared only 20% of the time. This is sig-
nificantly below chance (Kolmogorov Smirnov, p 6 .001). Moreover,
performance in the agent-present/individuation condition was also
significantly below children’s performance on knowledge questions
1 and 2 (related samples sign test, p 6 .001).
Finally, for (++) children, all theories make the same prediction
that children should eventually pass all four conditions. This was
observed: there is no reliable difference between the tasks (Wil-6 Again, Susi did not see the object while it was moved, and though the rattle was
shaken, Susi could not hear the rattle being moved from box 1 to box 2. Susi only
learns about the move via linguistic information. Compare footnote 3.
Fig. 9. Agent present/individuation condition.
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above chance (Kolmogorov Smirnov, all p 6 .003). However, only
the mental files theory links the improvement in performance from
(+) children to (++) on the agent-present/individuation condition
to the understanding of second-order beliefs. The observed drastic
improvement was highly significant (Mann Whitney U: p < .001).
This improvement stayed significant when covariance due to chil-
dren’s age and verbal IQ was accounted for (logistic regression:
Wald(1) = 5.64, p < .02), which shows that understanding second-
order beliefs is specifically related to mastery of intensionality
problems.
The results from our experiment make clear that mental files
theory can predict an unusual, unexpected pattern of performance
that other proposals do not match. The most critical feature of the
results is the fact that performance on the agent-present individu-
ation condition deteriorates as children pass false belief tests and
recovers when they understand second-order beliefs. Due to its
importance we replicated this pattern of results with 6 (), 21
(+) and 5 (++) children for the two individuation conditions. Per-
cent correct for the three groups were 50%, 81%, and 100% for the
agent-absent condition and 83%, 24%, and 80% for the agent-
present condition. The critical difference between agent-present
and agent-absent conditions for (+) children was statistically reli-
able (related samples sign test, p 6 .001).3.2.3. Alternative views
Our explanation for our data proceeds from the assumption that
children who fail verbal false belief tasks are unable to track peo-
ple’s beliefs by using vicarious files, as defended in Perner and
Leahy (in press). This assumption leaves room for accommodating
the rapidly increasing evidence that even infants show some sensi-
tivity to people’s beliefs (Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate & Vernetti, 2014; Surian et al., 2007)
and the possibility that these children track beliefs by some other
means for which various proposals have been made (Butterfill &
Apperly, 2013; Perner & Roessler, 2012; Ruffman, 2014;
Wellman, 2014). Our mental files analysis may help to pin down
the difference between knowledge underlying non-verbal mea-
sures and knowledge underlying verbal measures of understanding
belief. An interesting suggestion comes from one of our anony-
mous reviewers: perhaps () children do not use files headed
by linguistic terms for the non-verbal tests; they may use fully
mature but non-linguistic conceptual files instead. () children
generate their non-verbal responses by employing a single concep-
tual file for the objects they see, with different kind-properties
stored as predicative information such as ‘‘is a rattle” and ‘‘is a
ball”. With success on verbal false belief tasks, children start to
use linguistic files. When they encounter different terms for a sin-
gle object, they open multiple files for that object, resulting in
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This suggestion, like any other, needs to be worked out in detail.
One central hurdle for all potential suggestions is to explain why
children use the non-linguistic conceptual files for their anticipa-
tory looking (anticipating Mistaken Max to return to where he
thinks his chocolate is) and use the linguistic files for answering
the question where Max will look for his chocolate. The two mea-
sures strongly dissociate in young three year olds for otherwise
identical presentation of the stories (Clements & Perner, 1994;
Garnham & Perner, 2001; Low, 2010; Low, Drummond,
Walmsley, & Wang, 2014; Low & Watts, 2012).
Another of our reviewers provided a similar alternative specifi-
cally addressing features of our data. () children are not sensi-
tive to the linguistically encoded difference between predicative
and individuative information, therefore they give correct answers
in both conditions. In contrast (+) children are sensitive to this
difference but interpret linguistically encoded individuative infor-
mation in a manner that is at odds with the identity of the ball and
the rattle. They are unable to inhibit or overcome this tendency,
which yields wrong answers in the agent present/individuation
condition. This explains the drop in performance from () to
(+) children. The findings in the literature that () children have
problems with alternative naming (Doherty & Perner, 1998;
Perner, Stummer, Sprung, & Doherty, 2002) shows that they are
sensitive to individuative information or else they would not have
the problems with alternative naming that they have. Moreover,
the reviewer’s assumption that (+) children have problems with
the identity of the ball and the rattle is at odds with the finding
that children who pass the false belief test are also good at under-
standing identity (Perner et al., 2011) and with the fact that they
have no problem tracking the identity of the ball and the rattle
in answering the reality question (‘‘Where is the ball?”), though
they do struggle with ‘‘Where will Susi look for the ball” in the
agent present/individuation condition.7
3.3. Discussion
The larger question behind this research is how a theory of
mind can be acquired and whether it comes as a piece or in parts.
Some nativist theorists (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Leslie,
1994) are modularists and treat theory of mind as an unanalysed
ability provided by evolution. Even theorists in favour of an onto-
genetic acquisition of theory of mind (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997;
Wellman, 1990, 2014) only describe the acquisition process in
terms of component concepts available from our everyday expla-
nations of behaviour. Notably Wellman (1990) characterised the
transition around 4 years as one from a desire psychology to a
belief-desire psychology, and Tomasello and Call (2006) describe
the level of understanding achieved by animals in terms of ‘‘see-
ing”, ‘‘knowing”, etc. The reluctance to open discussion about dee-
per subpersonal processes underlying the acquisition of these
common sense concepts stems from the fact that most of our con-
cepts cannot be defined in terms of more basic concepts (Fodor,
1981) and the lack of a systematic theory of how concepts can
be acquired, which led Fodor to posit the innateness of even the
most abstract concepts (LOT: Fodor, 1975).
Against this background Apperly and Robinson’s window poses
serious problems. Children seem to master the concept of belief
when they pass the false belief task. Hence it makes no sense that
it takes another 2 years for them to come to grips with the inten-
sionality of belief. Rakoczy et al. (2015) tried to solve this enigma
with reference to task difficulty. Their simplified task used only7 The alternative proposal might appeal to the fact that there is nothing other than
the ball in the two boxes, as we did do explain the same ability in () children. See
footnote 5.one object, reducing memory load and referential ambiguity. The
enigma disappeared: children who passed the false belief task also
passed the agent-absent ‘‘intensionality” task. However, children’s
problems with intensionality re-emerge full force in our agent-
present/individuation condition. This re-emergence is difficult to
reconcile with a difference in task complexity. The agent-present
conditions cannot be harder than the agent-absent conditions,
since the agent and subject share all knowledge.4. Conclusion
Mental files have a proven track record in several disciplines,
but have seen only limited use in the psychological literature.
We have drawn on work from linguistics and philosophy to pro-
duce a theory of information storage and retrieval in terms of men-
tal files. The resulting theory shows how the ability to understand
belief is a cumulative process, and is alone in the literature in being
able to account for all existing data regarding the understanding of
the intensionality of belief. Particularly challenging is explaining
how the ability to understand the intensionality of belief develops.
Our theory generated novel and remarkable predictions that were
not generated by any other theory, and empirical tests conse-
quently recommended our theory over the alternatives.
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